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Case Comment
CHOICE OF LAW GOVERNING A CONTRACT WHERE 
ITS EXISTENCE IS IN DISPUTE
Clarifications from the Singapore International Commercial 
Court in
Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala
[2020] 3 SLR 61
The Singapore International Commercial Court’s judgment 
in Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 
3 SLR 61 is noteworthy as it heralds a modest development in 
Singapore private international law, especially in respect to the 
not uncommon issue of disputes over cross-border contracts 
where its existence is challenged. This case represents one of 
the handful of Singapore precedents which directly addresses 
the difficult conundrum where both the governing law and 
the existence of the underlying contract are in dispute. Under 
this context, it articulates a default choice of law position – the 
lex fori – where it is impossible to objectively identify, factually, 
the law parties would have chosen. This article provides an 
inquisitive and critical comment of the case.
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I. Introduction
1 Discerning the choice of law governing a disputed relationship, 
where a challenge to the fundamental existence of that relationship 
contractually is litigated, between parties to an international business 
transaction is undoubtedly a difficult exercise for courts. Whilst 
international commercial transactions have become increasingly 
common, Singapore private international law has been slow to fashion 
a solution to respond to this difficult problem, entirely leaving it to 
gradually evolve through judicial precedents in its courts (that is, the 
common law). Mavis Chionh JC in Pegaso Servicios Administrativos SA 
de CV v DP Offshore Engineering Pte Ltd2 remarked that the precedents 
available in the common law on this issue are “admittedly insubstantial”.3
2 Thus, a case from the Singapore International Commercial Court 
(“SICC”) – Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala4 (“Solomon 
Lew”) – ruling specifically on the matter is noteworthy and merits deeper 
analysis, for it will shape the way Singapore courts will decide on matters 
as to governing law, until a Court of Appeal decision is rendered.
II. Facts
3 The pertinent facts of this litigation may be briefly summarised 
as follows. In September 2017, the plaintiff, Lew, had approached Mr and 
Mrs Nargolwala (the first and second defendants) to purchase a luxury 
villa in Phuket, Thailand. Mr and Mrs Nargolwala had purchased that 
villa in 2007 through a company incorporated in the British Virgin 
Islands, Querencia Ltd (“Querencia”). The purchase would be effected 
from a transfer of shares in Querencia to the purchaser. Lew alleged that 
on 11 October 2017, he had concluded a binding oral agreement for the 
purchase of the villa, with Daniel Meury, the general manager of the 
villa. Lew further alleged that Meury was acting as an authorised agent of 
Mr and Mrs Nargolwala. Unfortunately for Lew, the ownership of the villa 
was transferred to a third party (Quo Vadis Investment Ltd, controlled 
by Christian Larpin, the third and fourth defendants, respectively) in 
November 2017. How this transfer was executed is not relevant for the 
purposes of this article.
4 In the SICC, Lew applied for remedies flowing from a breach of 
the alleged oral contract, a breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of trust. 
2 [2019] SGHC 47.
3 Pegaso Servicios Administrativos SA de CV v DP Offshore Engineering Pte Ltd [2019] 
SGHC 47 at [73].
4 [2020] 3 SLR 61.
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For the purposes of this article, the author will only focus on examining 
the court’s conflict of laws analysis with respect to the breach of the 
alleged oral contract.
5 As it was the existence of an oral agreement that was in dispute, 
it was incredibly difficult for parties to discern and show in court 
what express law was chosen to apply to it. Believing that it would be 
advantageous to his case, Lew submitted that Singapore law should 
be the governing law of the disputed contract. Conversely, Mr and 
Mrs Nargolwala submitted that Thai law should be the governing law of 
the disputed contract. The SICC had to decide – by applying the conflict 
of laws rules of Singapore – which law ought to apply, in its determination 
of whether there was a binding contractual relationship between Lew and 
Mr and Mrs Nargolwala. This was a fairly novel issue to be determined in 
Singapore law, as the precedents only provide guidance on cases where 
there is no dispute that a binding contract exists between disputing 
parties.5
III. Decision of the SICC
6 The SICC ruled that Singapore law – which is the lex fori – 
would govern the disputed relationship between Lew and Mr and 
Mrs Nargolwala. Taking reference from the Singapore Court of Appeal 
decision in JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd6 (“JIO Minerals”), 
the court applied a three-stage “putative proper law test”7 in order of 
priority:
(a) The court will look for what parties have expressly 
chosen as the law governing their disputed relationship;
(b) Where (a) is unavailable, the court searches for what 
the parties’ intention as to the governing law of the contract 
may be by inferring from the facts available in the surrounding 
circumstances;
5 See JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391. There may also be 
the case of Pegaso Servicios Administrativos SA de CV v DP Offshore Engineering Pte 
Ltd [2019] SGHC 47 to consider. However, in that case the defendants had denied 
the existence of a collateral contract which had marginal connections to Mexico law 
but strong connections to Singapore law; in any event, the success of the defendant’s 
claim did not turn on the disputed possible governing laws of Mexican and Singapore 
law, because the court thought that in all circumstances under both laws a contract 
would not exist.
6 [2011] 1 SLR 391.
7 Cf  Pegaso Servicios Administrativos SA de CV v DP Offshore Engineering Pte Ltd 
[2019] SGHC 47 at [72].
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(c) Where (a) and (b) prove inconclusive, the court will put 
its mind to discerning which law had the closest and most real 
connection with the disputed relationship.
7 Interestingly, Simon Thorley IJ had expressed reservations about 
applying the JIO Minerals test given this particular factual matrix, where 
parties at litigation are disputing the existence or binding nature of 
a contract to begin with:8
Applying the three-stage approach introduces an element of circularity in that 
it involves first trying to ascertain what the governing law would have been if 
a contract had been made and then applying that law to determine whether it 
has in fact been made.
8 However, the court recognised that the JIO Minerals test provided 
a helpful framework which may be tempered by some necessary nuance 
to account for the context under which the basis or existence of the 
contract is fundamentally in dispute at litigation. Furthermore, Thorley 
IJ had articulated the default position of the court where it is impossible 
to discern objectively what the parties would have wanted, and if the 
connecting factors would not assist either parties: “In cases of doubt, the 
counsel of prudence would be to apply the lex fori.”9 In other words, the 
lex fori may be applied as a matter of last resort.
9 The court first regarded the disputed relationship between the 
parties as a “putative contract”. In that putative contract, the court was 
unable to find an express choice of governing law (stage one). However, at 
the second stage of the inquiry, the court thought that it may be discerned 
from the circumstances leading to that putative contract, through the 
parties’ common intention and conduct, that the parties would have 
intended the governing law of their relationship to be Singapore law.10 
The court had drawn the inference on the basis that the parties insisted 
and agreed that Singapore lawyers would be instructed at the moment 
in time when the disputed contract was formed. In an abundance of 
caution, Thorley IJ proceeded to the third stage of the inquiry. However, 
the analysis was futile: taking into account all relevant connecting factors, 
the court would have been unable at this stage to discern whether Thai 
law or Singapore law would provide the closest and most real connection 
to the putative contract.11 In this instance, the court was prepared to apply 
8 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [160].
9 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [164].
10 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [165]–[166].
11 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [169].
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the lex fori by default, but for the fact that it found at the second stage that 
Singapore law ought to apply.12
10 Applying Singapore law, the SICC found that there was no binding 
oral contract concluded between Lew and Mr and Mrs Nargolwala.13
IV. Comment
11 It bears note that this judgment from the SICC has illuminated 
the state of Singapore law on this difficult problem in the conflict of laws. 
Here, it is prudent to set out some of the settled principles where the 
choice of law of a cross-border relationship between parties is in dispute, 
particularly over the existence or formation of a contract.
A. Determining the governing law of contracts
12 First, the conflict rules for contractual obligations in Singapore 
private international law remain substantially similar to that of the 
English common law before the year 1991.14 Under the common law,15 
the governing law of a relationship between parties across borders is 
generally defined, as Briggs has put it succinctly, as “the law chosen, 
expressly or impliedly, by the parties, or if no law had been chosen, the 
law with which the contract had its closest and most real connection”.16 
Where it is impossible factually17 to identify objectively what law parties 
12 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [169].
13 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [246].
14 The English conflict of laws governing contractual obligations in relation to civil and 
commercial deals concluded after 1 April 1991 was modified by way of legislative 
intervention (Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 (c 36)), which brought the rules 
defined by the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(19 June 1980; entry into force 1 April 1991) into English law.
15 JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 391 at [79].
16 Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2019) at p 195.
17 This is in contrast with a case where there is an inherent indeterminacy of the proper 
law, where after examining the connecting factors one does not logically come to 
the conclusion that only one body of law governs the relationship, but rather two 
(or possibly more) bodies of law are clearly identified. See Dornoch Ltd v Mauritius 
Union Assurance Co Ltd [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 475 at [17]; in this case the insurers and 
reinsurers in dispute were bound by incorporated standard forms from England and 
Mauritius which contain conflicting express choices of English and Mauritius law 
respectively, resulting in a stalemate in the determination of the proper law governing 
a dispute over whether a Mauritius jurisdiction clause was validly incorporated 
into the overall agreement. Here, the lex fori may be administered in the event that 
there is a gap stemming from any inherent indeterminacy in the applicable law: see 
Tan Yock Lin, “Rationalising and Simplifying the Presumption of Similarity of Laws” 
(2016) 28 SAcLJ 172 at 187–188, para 21.
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would have chosen, and if the connecting factors do not assist the court 
in any way (as in Solomon Lew, where the factors were equally divided 
between Singapore and Thailand), the court may apply the lex fori as 
a measure of last resort. These conflict of laws principles apply to the 
determination of the governing law of a contract, in the context where its 
existence or formation is in dispute.18
B. Elucidating a default rule
13 Secondly, the default rule established in Solomon Lew that the 
court may administer the lex fori as a measure of last resort if the proper 
law may not be discerned from express or implied choice, and, if the 
remaining connecting factors do not assist the court in any way (resulting 
in factual19 indeterminacy),20 may find support in a theory proffered by 
Briggs in an article written in 1990.21 He had argued that this default 
position would inevitably result in circumstances where parties are 
simply not agreed that they have concluded a contract with each other.
14 But it is noteworthy that Briggs had also argued in the same article 
that courts should avoid an analysis of putative law (to which he refers 
ironically as some “pretended quasi-proper law”)22 governing a putative 
contract: it is evident that the SICC has not been inclined to adopt those 
views in Solomon Lew,23 as the court’s determination of the proper law 
turned on the ruling that an implied proper law of the disputed business 
relationship between the parties may be discerned successfully. In any 
case, Thorley IJ was not in favour of prioritising the default lex fori rule 
over the examination of putative law:24
This would, to my mind, be to introduce an approach which constitutes too 
much of a blunt instrument to serve the interests of justice. There will be cases 
where it is the appropriate course to take … but there will be others where the 
facts are sufficiently clear that justice can better be done by approaching the 
matter by reference to the three-stage test in JIO Minerals [which embraces 
the examination of a ‘putative contract’ and a ‘putative law’], with necessary 
adjustments to take into account that there is the fundamental dispute as to the 
existence of the contract in the first place.
18 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [162].
19 That is, where the factual connections are fairly evenly balanced and it is difficult 
to identify which is the system of law that has the closest connection with the 
transaction and the parties.
20 See Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 75.353.
21 Adrian Briggs, “The Formation of International Contracts” [1990] LMCLQ 192.
22 Adrian Briggs, “The Formation of International Contracts” [1990] LMCLQ 192 
at 202.
23 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [162].
24 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [162].
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C. “Putative proper law” of a “putative contract”?
15 Thirdly, the controversy behind the notion of a “putative 
contract”25  is probably an overstated or exaggerated problem. This 
controversy stems from the seemingly circular proposition that 
international contracts may not subsist without a governing law, 
implying that the governing law (or proper law) is determined before the 
existence of a contract, whilst the three-stage “putative proper law test” 
administered to determine the governing law appears to be paradoxically 
applied with reference to a concluded contract.
16 It is submitted that if the “putative contract” were reframed from 
the perspective of “potential business relationships yet to be concluded”, 
it is not inconceivable that parties during their process of conducting 
good faith negotiations leading to some sort of a more-than-marginal 
relationship with each other – which may not necessarily cross 
a contractual threshold – may:
(a) expressly state and/or record in some form a governing 
law which they would have desired their disputed relationship to 
be governed by;26 or
(b) be engaged in some sort of activity with each other,27 
the context from which a desired governing law they would 
have intended their disputed relationship to be governed by be 
discerned by implication.28
25 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [163]. Tan Yock 
Lin has opined that the search for a putative proper law of a putative contract is an 
endeavour that may be “pragmatic [but] dubious in logic”: Tan Yock Lin, “Good 
Faith Choice of a Law to Govern a Contract” [2014] Sing JLS 307 at 319.
26 A caveat to this assertion would be that in practice, such an express record of the 
desired governing law would be “unlikely” to occur, as observed by Thorley IJ: Lew, 
Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [163].
27 See Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [165]–[166].
28 Consider the case of Zebrarise Ltd v De Nieffe [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 154 as an 
illustration: in this case, the court opined that an English solicitor who practised in 
Belgium, who as a result argued that Belgian law should be applied as the law most 
closely connected to the dispute, and who was in dispute with an Irish property dealer 
who resided in England, had impliedly chosen English law to be the governing law 
of a loan contract concluded in Switzerland. This was because the disputing parties 
had stronger connections to England, and the court also found that the solicitor 
possessed no knowledge of Belgian law. Also consider Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v 
OOO “Insurance Co Chubb” [2020] EWCA Civ 574 at [91] ff, where the English 
Court of Appeal found that where parties have agreed to a seat of arbitration, the 
curial law would, as a matter of implied choice, govern that arbitration agreement. 
It is noteworthy that the majority of the UK Supreme Court (consisting of Lords 
Hamblen, Leggatt and Kerr) has overturned the use of a selection of a seat of 
arbitration in London as an indicator of an implied choice of English law applying to 
(cont’d on the next page)
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17 These are the two prioritised connecting factors which the 
Singapore courts would consider as benchmarks when attempting to 
discern the proper law governing a disputed business relationship over 
the existence or formation of a contract, paying due regard to protecting 
the reasonable expectations of the parties who engaged in good faith 
negotiations.29
18 But it bears emphasis that the substantive contract is not engaged 
by the court at this stage in its examination of such connecting factors. 
This is because the search for the law that governs the formation of the 
contract between the disputing parties may be separately defined as an 
inquiry that precedes the search for the law which governs the substance 
of the contract.30 Such an approach was observed when the English Court 
of Appeal in Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) 
Ltd31 (“The Amazonia”) was asked in part to determine, in a dispute over a 
charterparty, (a) whether an ad hoc arbitration agreement was concluded 
between the parties; and (b) if so concluded, whether the agreement 
was enforceable under its proper law.32 It was contended that either 
English or Australian law could apply. Delivering the leading judgment, 
Staughton LJ first considered the English law authorities in his speech, 
to determine if there was an agreement to arbitrate concluded between 
the parties,33 but acknowledging that this was done because of the 
concession that there was no difference between English and Australian 
law on the point.34 Having concluded that there was such an agreement, 
Staughton LJ then proceeded to determine what the governing law of the 
ad hoc arbitration agreement was,35 so that it may be applied to determine 
its enforceability.36 Therefore, from a broad and chronological reading 
the arbitration agreement by the English Court of Appeal, in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi 
AS v OOO “Insurance Co Chubb” [2020] UKSC 38 at  [73] ff; yet it remains open 
for argument whether the Singapore courts would prefer the approach taken by the 
English Court of Appeal or the UK Supreme Court.
29 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 75.353.
30 Cf Maria Hook, The Choice of Law Contract (Hart Publishing, 2016) at p 91. It is 
noteworthy that Hook goes further to observe that the separate definitions could 
“increase the likelihood that the choice of law agreement and the underlying contract 
are submitted to differing laws”.
31 [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 236.
32 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 236 at 240.
33 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 236 at 241–244.
34 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 236 at 244.
35 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 236 at 244. It was concluded that English law was the governing law.
36 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 236 at 245.
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of The Amazonia, it appears that it may be theoretically possible for the 
law which governs the conclusion of a contract to be different from the 
substance of the contract.37
19 The SICC also appears to have applied this approach recently. In 
Michael A Baker v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd38 (“Michael 
Baker”), the existence and validity of a trust agreement allegedly created 
by a deceased American business woman was disputed.39 Without 
reference to a “putative” proper law, the SICC undertook a thorough 
review of whether the trust was formed, where it was found that there 
was, on a prima facie basis, an existence of a trust agreement.40 The 
SICC subsequently undertook a review of the governing law of the trust 
agreement, and determined that it was Singapore law,41 before applying it 
to evaluate if it was valid and enforceable.
20 Yet it must be caveated that this observation in no way endorses 
the splitting of the proper law, because there is good argument that the 
law governing the matter of contract formation is spent when the courts 
conclude that it exists (or does not exist); where a contract was found to be 
concluded between the parties, the court (as observed in The Amazonia) 
may need to probe further to identify the proper law that governs issues 
of enforceability of the contract.42 In any event, it would still be the norm 
that the law governing the conclusion of the contract would coincide 
with the law governing the rights and obligations contained within it, 
including issues as to its validity and enforceability.43
21 Hence, it is submitted that the labelling of the proper law to 
be determined as “putative” is superfluous, because one is actually 
concerned about determining an observable governing law from a set of 
benchmarks available, distinctly different from subsequently applying that 
determined governing law to assess defects in relation to the underlying 
37 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 75.353.
38 [2020] 4 SLR 85.
39 Michael A Baker v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd [2020] 4 SLR 85 at [63].
40 Michael A Baker v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd [2020] 4 SLR 85 (“Michael 
Baker”) at [187]–[188]. Of note, it is possible that the Singapore International 
Commercial Court in Michael Baker adopted such an approach because the 
defendants had elected not to call evidence at trial (at [66]).
41 Michael A Baker v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd [2020] 4 SLR 85 at [206] 
and [211]–[214].
42 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 75.353.
43 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 75.353. For 
instance, in Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 236, the law which was determinative of the issue of existence of the 
impugned arbitration agreement was the same as the law applied to determine its 
validity and enforceability (that is, English law).
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disputed relationship which may or may not cross a contractual threshold. 
The notion of a “putative contract” is also imprecise as the courts, when 
determining the law governing potential business relationships which 
may have yet to be concluded, have already evidently put their mind to 
the possibility that a contract may or may not be found to subsist and 
bind the disputing parties, avoiding any circularity. For completeness, it 
is worth stating that the Singapore courts may next consider objective 
connecting factors linking the parties in their more-than-marginal (but 
disputed) relationship, if the two prioritised factors yield no indications 
as to the proper law, as benchmarks to identify the proper law.
D. (Non-)contractual nature of choice of law
22 Fourthly, the choice of law is an element of a cross-border 
relationship between parties that may be technically devoid of any 
substantive contractual content, unless the contractual parties intend 
otherwise.44 This thesis was persuasively put forward by Tan, based on 
the astute observation that when the court seeks to determine the choice 
of law governing a disputed relationship in circumstances where there is 
no indication otherwise by the parties, “there is no concern with whether 
its binding nature is itself suspect when the contract is allegedly not 
formed”.45
44 If the parties so intend, there must be a “meeting of the minds” for there to exist 
a choice of law which engenders promissory content: CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner 
Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543 at [50]. In cases where parties intend that their 
choice of law has promissory content, it bears note that if that choice is, in fact, 
a faulty one (for instance, if they agree that a floating proper law would apply, which 
is not permissible as at the time of contracting, one governing law ought to apply), 
logically, it may result in a failure to conclude a binding contract (see Tan Yock Lin, 
“Good Faith Choice of a Law to Govern a Contract” [2014] Sing JLS 307 at 320). The 
common law’s response to such an inherent indeterminacy in the proper law is to 
either (a) consider the contract not constituted; or (b) refer to the lex fori (cf Dornoch 
Ltd v The Mauritius Union Assurance Co Ltd [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 475 at [17]) to 
make an objective determination of what governing law ought to apply (cf Adrian 
Briggs, “The Formation of International Contracts” [1990] LMCLQ 192).
45 Tan Yock Lin, “Good Faith Choice of a Law to Govern a Contract” [2014] Sing 
JLS 307 at 319. In contrast, the proposition put forward by Dr Maria Hook, who had 
attempted to examine how choice of law is an element founded in contract and party 
autonomy, yields an incoherent and undesirable conclusion, to which she proposes 
sweeping reforms over its determination: see Maria Hook, The Choice of Law 
Contract (Hart Publishing, 2016) at p 222 ff. A related conundrum is observed in 
CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543, where the Court of 
Appeal was asked to give contractual weight to an express choice of law clause which 
arose from a fraudulent transaction. The Court of Appeal declined to do so because 
it found that there was no “meeting of the minds” between parties, and hence there 
was no agreement concluded as to the choice of law clause (at [50]). Whilst it was 
unclear from the judgment which governing law was applied in the determination of 
whether a choice of law agreement was concluded, it was suggested that the lex fori 
(cont’d on the next page)
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23 Consequently, an express choice of law, made in the context of 
a disputed relationship that may or may not cross a contractual threshold 
(which may appear to engender some binding effect but for the lack of 
indication of a “meeting of the minds”46 between parties), leads merely 
to an evidentiary presumption in the forum that that expressly chosen 
law would apply as the governing law of the relationship between parties 
at litigation.47 When read from this perspective, concerns over the 
circularity ensuing when courts attempt to discern what the governing 
law would have been if a contract had been concluded, and subsequently 
administer that law to decide if indeed that contract had been concluded, 
would be marginalised. In this way, an express choice of law by parties to 
govern (generally) their business relationship is prioritised as the element 
which best elucidates the proper law to be applied by the courts.
24 In the absence of an express choice (and in the same context as 
discussed above), where the courts seek (and are able) to discern an implied 
choice of law of the parties based on their conduct and the surrounding 
factual circumstances leading to the conclusion of an alleged contract, 
the derivation of that implied “choice” should not fall foul of similar 
concerns of circularity. To be doubly clear and for avoidance of doubt, this 
proposition proceeds on the basis of a non-contractual and evidentiary 
content of a choice of law proffered by Tan: this means the benchmark 
indicators that inferences may be drawn from the determination of 
an implied choice of law would be quite different from those taken to 
buttress an implied contractual term.48 The function of an implied choice 
of law diverges from an implied contractual term because its derivation 
shades into the identification of a system of law with which the contract 
has its closest and most real connection.49 As a result it may be the norm 
for courts to look at fictional indicators to discern the implied choice of 
was applied: Adeline Chong, “Void Contracts and the Applicability of Choice of 
Law Clauses to Consequential Restitutionary Claims – CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner 
Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 543” (2009) 21 SAcLJ 545 at 555, para 32. But under 
such circumstances, where the existence of the agreement in dispute was essentially 
a procedural question of law (that is, what law is to be applied by the proper forum, 
which is the Singapore courts, to govern the dispute), it is not surprising to find that 
the Court of Appeal indeed applied the lex fori directly without recourse to the JIO 
Minerals test (as elucidated in 2008 in Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology Inc 
[2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 [36]): cf Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No 3) 
[1996] 1 WLR 387 at 399.
46 Cf CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 543 at [50].
47 Tan Yock Lin, “Good Faith Choice of a Law to Govern a Contract” [2014] Sing 
JLS 307 at 319.
48 See Maria Hook, The Choice of Law Contract (Hart Publishing, 2016) at pp 152–155.
49 Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO “Insurance Co Chubb” [2020] EWCA Civ 574 
at [70].
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law.50 Take for instance, the mere fact of selection of London arbitration 
clauses may be recognised by courts as indicators of implied choice of 
English law with respect to that forum selection clause, even though its 
contractual validity or existence is in dispute.51
V. Critique
25 It is submitted that the SICC’s approach to discerning the choice 
of law governing a disputed relationship (that is, where a challenge to 
the fundamental existence of that relationship contractually is litigated) 
between parties to an international business transaction is difficult to 
impeach. In the absence of legislative guidance,52 maintaining the “putative 
proper law test”53 is desirable, as it mitigates raising too high the hurdles 
to contract formation in the cross-border context,54 preserving any good 
faith parties – who (or which) originate from contrasting backgrounds 
and legal traditions – may possess when they proceed to negotiate deals 
with a view to conclude cross-border business relationships.
A. Governing law of contract formation or existence
26 As a general observation, the SICC in Solomon Lew, in its 
determination of the existence (or formation) of a contract between 
the parties at litigation, appears to apply a slightly different proper law 
analysis from the approach taken by a separate three-judge bench on the 
SICC in Michael Baker. To recall, in Michael Baker, the existence and 
validity of a trust agreement allegedly created by a deceased American 
businesswoman was disputed.55 Without reference to a “putative” proper 
law (which was alleged to be either Singapore or California law), the 
SICC in Michael Baker first undertook a thorough review of whether the 
trust was formed. The court found that there was, on a prima facie basis, 
an existence of a trust agreement.56 The SICC subsequently undertook 
50 Maria Hook, The Choice of Law Contract (Hart Publishing, 2016) at pp 155–159.
51 See Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO “Insurance Co Chubb” [2020] EWCA Civ 574 
at [91] ff; Compania Naviera Micro SA v Shipley International Inc [1982] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 351 at 353; and Egon Oldendorff v Liberia Corp (No 1) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 64 
at 69–71. Note the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v 
OOO “Insurance Co Chubb” [2020] UKSC 38, discussed at n 28 above.
52 Cf Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I).
53 See Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [162].
54 See Tan Yock Lin, “Good Faith Choice of a Law to Govern a Contract” [2014] Sing 
JLS 307 at 319.
55 Michael A Baker v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd [2020] 4 SLR 85 at [63].
56 Michael A Baker v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd [2020] 4 SLR 85 (“Michael 
Baker”) at [187]–[188]. It is possible that the Singapore International Commercial 
(cont’d on the next page)
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a review of the governing law of the trust agreement and determined that 
it was Singapore law.57
27 In contrast, the SICC in Solomon Lew first undertook an 
examination of what the “putative” proper law governing the formation of 
the disputed contract should be (which was alleged to be either Singapore 
or Thai law),58 ruling that Singapore law was the implied choice of law.59 
Applying Singapore law, Thorley IJ found that there was no binding oral 
agreement concluded between the parties.60 The SICC later proceeded, 
in an abundance of caution, to consider in obiter dicta if a binding oral 
agreement had been concluded if Thai law were the governing law.61 
Thorley  IJ ruled that there would also be no binding oral agreement 
concluded under Thai law.62 Also in an abundance of caution, Thorley IJ 
examined in obiter dicta – if the court were to be incorrect with its 
application of Singapore and Thai law on the issue of contract formation – 
how both Thai and Singapore law would have applied to enforce the 
disputed contract.63
28 It is submitted that the approach taken in Solomon Lew is the 
more logical one, as the proper law should be first discerned before 
a judgment may be made over whether an agreement has been concluded 
between the disputing parties.64 Only if the court has satisfied itself that 
there is no difference in the result engendered by the competing laws 
regarding the issue of contract formation65 then could the approach in 
Michael Baker be endorsed.66 It should also logically follow that if there 
Court in Michael Baker adopted such an approach because the defendants had 
elected not to call evidence at trial (at [66]).
57 Michael A Baker v BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd [2020] 4 SLR 85 at [206] 
and [211]–[214].
58 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [156]–[170].
59 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [170].
60 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [246].
61 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [257]–[266].
62 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [266].
63 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [249]–[275].
64 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 236 at 244.
65 Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 236 at 244. Take for instance, in Pegaso Servicios Administrativos SA de CV v DP 
Offshore Engineering Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 47 at [74], Mavis Chionh JC found that 
the existence of a collateral contract in dispute between the parties was not found, 
having considered both Singapore and Mexican law.
66 Yet it is acknowledged that the SICC adopted such an approach in Michael A Baker v 
BCS Business Consulting Services Pte Ltd [2020] 4 SLR 85 because of the way the case 
was pleaded and argued, given that the defendants had elected not to call evidence 
at trial (at [66]). Under such circumstances, it may be prudent (or logical) that the 
lex fori is to be applied in the prima facie determination; but in any event the court 
(cont’d on the next page)
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is indeed a difference in the result67 engendered by the competing laws 
regarding the issue of contract formation (for instance, if Singapore law 
would be inclined to find a binding contract formed, while Thai law 
would not), the same approach must be taken. The determination of the 
governing law should not, in principle, hinge on the outcome of whether 
the arrangement between the disputing parties would, under one or 
the other law, be considered a concluded contract.68 In Singapore, the 
High Court in BNA v BNB69 when rejecting the “validation principle”70 – 
a controversial choice of law methodology sometimes applied in 
international commercial arbitration that informs the court of what the 
proper law of an arbitration agreement is not, based on whether it would 
lead to the finding of a binding and valid agreement71 – had persuasively 
explained that such a methodology applied to derive the governing 
law of a contractual agreement would offend the principle of effective 
interpretation of a contract,72 and is inconsistent with legal authority.73
did not provide any further elaboration on which law it applied as a benchmark 
for that prima facie determination (cf  Furness Withy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Metal 
Distributors (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 236).
67 Here it is observed from the reported Singapore cases that where Singapore law 
and a competing foreign law may be applied as the governing law to determine 
if a disputed contract has been formed, the same result would have been reached 
if either Singapore law or that foreign law had been applied. Apart from Solomon 
Lew, see Pegaso Servicios Administrativos SA de CV v DP Offshore Engineering Pte 
Ltd [2019] SGHC 47 at [74], where Mavis Chionh JC found that the existence of 
a collateral contract in dispute between the parties was not found, even if either 
Singapore or Mexican law (as pleaded by the parties’ experts on Mexican law) were 
to be applied by the court.
68 BNA v BNB [2019] SGHC 142 at [53].
69 [2019] SGHC 142.
70 Gary Born, “International Commercial Arbitration” (Kluwer Law International, 
2nd Ed, 2014) at pp 24–27.
71 BNA v BNB [2019] SGHC 142 at [51].
72 That is, courts must respect party autonomy to form contracts and do their level best 
to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intention, not to give effect to contractual 
relationships, come what may, without directly addressing the intentions of the 
parties: see BNA v BNB [2019] SGHC 142 at [53].
73 BNA v BNB [2019] SGHC 142 at [52]–[66]. It is noteworthy that the majority of the 
UK Supreme Court (consisting of Lords Hamblen, Leggatt and Kerr) has appeared 
to endorse the application of the validation principle in the common law, in Enka 
Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO “Insurance Co Chubb” [2020] UKSC 38 at [95] ff. Yet it 
remains open for argument whether the Singapore courts would ultimately adopt 
the approach taken by the UK Supreme Court. It may also be possible that the 
Singapore courts could limit the general application of the validation principle to 
arbitration agreements.
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B. Lex fori and factual indeterminacy in cross-border disputes 
over contract formation
29 The SICC has also elucidated a default conflict of laws position in 
the common law, in the matter of choice of law governing the formation 
of a contract with international elements, as a matter of procedural 
necessity, where there is factual indeterminacy74 in relation to the 
connecting factors indicating the law that ought to be the proper law. The 
reliance on the lex fori under such circumstances of factual indeterminacy 
may be prudent, for where the governing law of a disputed relationship 
(that may or may not cross a contractual threshold) is also in dispute, it is 
said that the reliance on either party’s submission of what the proper law 
ought to be may be equally unfair to the other party.75 Applying the law 
of the forum by default breaks the stalemate. Yet this may be viewed as 
a significant departure from the common law choice of law methodology. 
If factual indeterminacy (in the context of a disputed relationship that 
may or may not cross a contractual threshold) provides a reason for the 
courts to abandon the three-stage JIO Minerals test and proceed directly 
to applying the lex fori instead, there is a chance that similar principles 
may apply to cross-border tort and family disputes in private international 
law.
30 At least for the litigation of cross-border tort disputes in 
Singapore, it is submitted that the weight of precedents prevents such 
a default rule from applying. In cross-border tort litigation, where the 
relevant connecting factors are spread evenly across several states,76 it 
is conceivable that factual indeterminacy may provide the impetus for 
the Singapore court to apply the lex fori without resort to the second 
limb of the “double actionability rule”,77 which engenders a search and 
74 That is, where the factual connections are fairly evenly balanced and it is difficult 
to identify which is the system of law that has the closest connection with the 
transaction and the parties. This is in contrast to a case where there is an inherent 
indeterminacy of the proper law, where after examining the connecting factors, one 
does not logically come to the conclusion that only one body of law governs the 
relationship, but rather two (or possibly more) bodies of law are clearly identified.
75 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6(2) (LexisNexis, 2016 Reissue) at para 75.353.
76 This was referred to as a “miasma of uncertain connections” in IM Skaugen SE v 
MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [55].
77 The double actionability rule has been laid out in Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 
and restated in Singapore law by the Court of Appeal in Rickshaw Investments Ltd v 
Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 at [53]:
Put simply, this rule states that in order for a [cross-border] tort to be actionable 
in Singapore, the alleged wrong must be actionable not only under the law of 
the forum (the lex fori) but also under the law of the place where the wrong was 
in fact committed (the lex loci delicti). In other words, both these limbs must 
be satisfied.
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identification of the lex loci delicti.78 In this scenario, attention must be 
paid to the applicability of a “flexible exception”,79 set out by the Court of 
Appeal in Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull.80
31 Of course, if the relevant connecting factors are spread across 
states to the exception of Singapore, it is unlikely for the Singapore courts 
to seize proceedings over the cross-border tort to begin with, without 
a jurisdiction agreement, nipping the question of whether the lex fori 
ought to apply at its bud.81 But if there were a jurisdiction agreement 
presented under the same scenario, the “flexible exception” may preclude 
the applicability of the lex fori because the tort has no connection at all 
with Singapore,82 but any subsequent inherent indeterminacy in the 
search for the applicable law may bring back the relevance of the lex fori.83 
In circumstances where the relevant connecting factors are spread 
across several states including Singapore (and assuming that Singapore 
is the most appropriate forum or chosen forum to hear the dispute), it 
is submitted that the courts may also apply the “flexible exception” into 
its analysis: in doing so, the courts are bound by a default rule which 
modifies the proper law analysis by eschewing unfairness and injustice 
arising from a rigid application of the “double actionability rule” (that 
is, the lex fori and whatever the lex loci delicti may generally be).84 The 
default rule in Solomon Lew, which conceives that factual indeterminacy 
(in the context of a disputed relationship that may or may not cross 
a contractual threshold) may provide a reason for the courts to abandon 
the usual proper law analysis and proceed directly to applying the lex fori 
instead, must be subordinate to the “flexible exception” analysis, a specific 
rule that is applicable in the context of cross-border tort litigation in 
Singapore.
32 Here, it bears emphasis that the default rule in Solomon Lew is to 
be applied exceptionally, when the three-stage JIO Minerals test leads to 
78 That is, the place where the tort was, in fact, committed.
79 Cf Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 at [66].
80 [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377.
81 See MAN Diesel & Turbo SE v IM Skaugen SE [2020] 1 SLR 327 at [136]–[137]. In 
this case, from the reported judgment it appears that the possible lex loci delicti spans 
across Norwegian and German law, but it was clear, in any event, that Singapore law 
was not applicable at all. Hence, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Singapore courts 
cannot be said to be a more appropriate forum to hear the dispute and set aside 
service of proceedings issued by the Singapore High Court to hear the case.
82 Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 at [57].
83 Dornoch Ltd v Mauritius Union Assurance Co Ltd [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 475 at [17]; 
Tan Yock Lin, “Rationalising and Simplifying the Presumption of Similarity of Laws” 
(2016) 28 SAcLJ 172 at 187–188, para 21.
84 Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 
at [56]–[66]; and IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [62].
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factual indeterminacy. In this way, undesirable forum shopping incentives 
are diminished, as the Singapore court is not bound to apply the lex fori 
in all circumstances, especially in this context where a determination of 
whether a disputed international business relationship has indeed been 
crystallised in contract is crucial. The unique or idiosyncratic features 
of Singapore contract law,85 which may lead to disadvantages to the 
defendant party who is left with no choice but to defend a suit filed first-
in-time by the plaintiff in the Singapore court, would be less of a factor 
when parties choose to litigate in Singapore. It is commendable that in 
an abundance of caution, the SICC took pains to consider in obiter dicta 
if the disputed contract were validly constituted under both Singapore 
and Thai contract law;86 even though the court ruled that Singapore law 
is to apply; such an examination in a rendered court judgment is strictly 
unnecessary.
C. Clarification over notion of “putative contract” and “putative 
proper law”
33 Finally, it is submitted that it would have been desirable for the 
SICC to have taken the opportunity to provide some clarification over 
85 Take the following (and interesting) precedent in Singapore contract law on contract 
formation for instance, from the case of Oei Hong Leong v Chew Hua Seng [2020] 
SGHC 39. In that case, the High Court found that a signed note containing obligations 
between two experienced businessmen for one to procure a purchaser of shares held 
by the other at a stated price one month from the date of the drafting of that note 
in exchange for an amicable resolution of an ongoing dispute had no enforceable 
contractual content, for a number of reasons. The court, when ruling that it did 
not find any demonstration of an intention to create legal relations between the 
experienced businessmen, thought (at [54]):
Had the [note] been meant to be legally binding, as commercial men, they 
would have instructed their lawyers to draft a legal document to capture 
their obligations accurately. But they did not do so. They considered the 
[note], drafted by a layperson, to be adequate precisely because it did not hold 
a  legal function. It is [furthermore] important to reiterate the context of the 
16 October Meeting [when the note was drafted], which was a gathering for 
[the businessmen in dispute] to resolve their differences. Against this backdrop 
[of a casual, friendly setting], it is plausible that the pair may have wanted 
to use the [note] as a  symbolic gesture, evidencing their reconciliation. This 
also explains why they both signed the [note] and made [a close relative] 
witness this.
This precedent in Singapore law (which is, at the time of writing, subject to 
appeal) may be exploited by a party hoping to avoid obligations recorded 
in a  signed document, if they were to first lodge their suit in the Singapore 
courts and the lex fori would apply in all circumstances where the fundamental 
existence of an international business contractual relationship is challenged 
in court.
86 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [249]–[275].
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the notion of a “putative contract”,87 leading to the determination of 
a “putative proper law”. As this article has argued above, the notion of 
a “putative contract” is probably an overstated or exaggerated problem. 
This was a missed opportunity to put the controversy to rest.
VI. Conclusion
34 The SICC’s judgment in Solomon Lew is noteworthy as it heralds 
a modest development in Singapore private international law, especially 
with respect to the not uncommon issue of disputes over cross-border 
contracts where its existence is challenged. This case represents one 
of the handful of Singapore precedents which directly addresses the 
intellectually-challenging conundrum where both the governing law and 
the existence of the underlying contract are in dispute. In this context, 
the SICC has articulated a default choice of law position – the lex fori – 
where it is impossible to objectively identify factually the law parties 
would have chosen. Aside from litigation over whether substantive cross-
border contractual agreements have been concluded under the relevant 
law, Solomon Lew could be a useful precedent to consider in future when 
the existence of forum selection clauses (for instance, choice of court 
and arbitration agreements) is in dispute:88 such challenges in court have 
become fairly common in recent times.89 As Singapore has been slow 
to legislate to regulate the law applicable to contractual obligations in 
cross-border contracts, the Singapore courts must rely on the common 
law for guidance.90 Subject to legislative intervention or any possible 
modifications on appeal, it is believed that Solomon Lew will define 
how the law applicable to contractual obligations (where its existence is 
challenged) is determined by the Singapore courts in the years to come.
87 Lew, Solomon v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala [2020] 3 SLR 61 at [163].
88 Cf Yeo Tiong Min, “The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and 
Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306.
89 See Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO “Insurance Co Chubb” [2020] EWCA Civ 574 
at [69] ff.
90 Cf Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 at [66].
© 2020 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
